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 This study explores democratic practice in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic in the light of globally 
prescribed and acceptable norms, tenets and values of democracy as a form of 
government. The study was conducted in Nigeria and adopted a multistage sampling 
technique to administer questionnaire to 700 delegates across the six (6) geopolitical 
zones of Nigeria’s 36 States. The results and findings show that Nigeria’s democracy is 
plagued with massive electoral fraud, including intimidation, disenfranchisement of 
eligible contestants and voters from participating in the democratic process, corruption of 
the election process, scam, and fraudulent declaration of winners of elections. The 
implications of such democratic deceit in Nigeria’s democracy includes voter apathy 
resulting from lack of confidence in the democratic process and outcome, violence and 
political instability and the nonparticipation of qualified and honest  citizens in the politics 
of Nigeria. Consequently, leaders that emerge from Nigeria’s democratic politics are not 
always the choice of the people, which explains why they are not accountable to the 
people as well as why there is deficit of public trust in Nigeria’s democratic system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Despite the myriad of challenges associated with democratic practice (AKE, 
2001; SIGNER, 2009), democracy is generally considered to be the best form of 
government that guarantees collective progress for the people (HELD, 2006; 
ACHEBE, 2012). This is because, democratic government gives the people the 
opportunity to elect those who would represent or lead them at the political 
scene. However, the democratic experiences of some nations have debunked the 
generally held idea that democracy is the government of the people as 
democracy has increasingly become associated with vices that undermine 
democratic norms, values and principles. Leight, Pande and Ralston (2016) note 
that democracy in both developed and developing countries is threatened by 
vote-buying; Signer (2009) identified demagoguery as a problem of democracy 
across the world; Held (2006) emphasized the role of despotic power in 
undermining democracy; Kirkpatrick (1982) identified dictatorship by 
democratically elected leaders as a major problem of democracy; and Gberevbie 
(2014) emphasized the failure of democracies because of weakened democratic 
institutions in some so called democratic States.  
Democracy in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic is bedeviled with incidences of 
criminality ranging from allegations and provable indictments of abuse of power 
and the use of the military and thugs by politicians to rigging of elections to 
subvert the choices of the masses (KOFAMATA, 2007; BAKARE, 2013). 
DEMOCRATIC NORM FOR ELECTIONS 
The Copenhagen document of 1990 articulates international standards for 
democratic elections (HALL; WANG, 2008) and they include: regular and 
periodical elections; guaranteed universal and equal suffrage; respect for the 
rights of citizens to seek political office; respect for the right to establish political 
parties and ensure that the parties can compete on the basis of equal treatment 
before the law; ensure that political campaigning can be conducted in a free and 
fair atmosphere without administrative action, violence, intimidation, or fear of 
retribution against candidates, parties or voters; ensure unimpeded access to the 
media on a nondiscriminatory basis; ensure that votes are cast by secret ballot, 
and are counted and reported honestly, with the results made public; ensure that 
candidates who win the necessary votes to be elected are duly installed and are 
permitted to remain in office until their terms expire.  
The above standards for credible democratic elections have continued to 
evade Nigeria because of the antidemocratic postures and attitudes of Nigerian 
politicians who seldom go into politics for the purpose of selfless service of the 
people (GBEREVBIE, 2014; BABANAWA 2013; AKE, 1993). And because Nigerian 
politicians see politics as business, and engage in political affairs as means of 
enriching themselves (OFEIMUN, 2010), they circumvent the acceptable norms of 
democratic politics to win elections at all cost (ARIYE et al. 2012). 
Bakare (2013) has argued that Nigerian politicians do know for sure that they 
will fail at the polls if they ever allowed for free and fair elections. Thus, they do 
not let their electoral fortunes to be determined by the people through free and 
fair elections. The average Nigerian politician engages in all forms of electoral 
fraud to achieve election success. 
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CRIMINALITY 
The credence attributed to representative democracy is derived from 
popular elections (COX, 1997). This highlights the importance of elections in 
democracy, and makes the credibility of elections essential to the survival, 
growth and credibility of democracy wherever they exist as a form of 
government. Importantly, the credibility of elections is measured not just by the 
existence of electoral laws but by the willingness, on the part of the political 
actors or electorates, to understand and adhere to the laws and practices that 
govern such democratic elections. Violations of the democratic norms, values and 
principles as stipulated by the Nigerian constitution, the electoral acts and other 
relevant laws in the quest to ‘win’ elections at all cost is what has been termed 
criminality in this discourse.  
Although all democracies have their flaws in the context of elections (FUND, 
2008), the nature and extent of violations of electoral laws and election fraud 
vary from country to country (DOSANTO, 2008). 
It is important to identify the types of criminality that are being perpetrated 
by political stakeholders in Nigeria, and to determine the extent to which each of 
these criminal acts determine or influence election outcomes in Nigeria.  
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Although Nigeria currently practices democracy as a form of government, 
democratic politics in Nigeria has been said to be enmeshed in electoral fraud 
and violence, particularly in the Fourth Republic, beginning from 1999 to date 
(NWATU, 2004; OFEIMUM, 2010). Whereas the incidences of political corruption 
and election fraud have both been identified by Election Tribunal and Court 
judgments, not much have been determined to ascertain the contributory roles 
of the various acts of criminality in election outcomes in the democratic politics 
of Nigeria.  
Thus, this paper presents what data says about the nature of criminality in 
Nigeria’s democracy and their influence on Nigeria’s election outcomes, with 
particular reference to primary elections.  
STUDY AREA AND METHODOLOGY 
The study used quantitative data by means of survey questionnaire. Self-
administered questionnaire was administered to delegates of the Peoples 
Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Progressives Congress (APC), the two main 
political parties in Nigeria. The multistage sampling technique was used in 
selecting the sample for the study. In the first instance, the population was 
delineated by the six geopolitical zones that make up Nigeria. Through the use of 
simple random technique, six states, one state from each zone, were selected for 
the study. The Federal Capital Territory (FCT), the central seat of government, 
was also added for the study.  
Seven hundred (700) delegates, made up of 100 delegates each per State 
and the FCT, participated in the quantitative aspect of study that involves the 
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distribution of self-administered questionnaires. However, six hundred and fifty-
eight questionnaires were filled and returned. 
Figure 1 - Map of Nigeria showing the six geo-political zones 
 
As shown in Figure 1, Nigeria is structured into six (6) geopolitical zones that 
include North-West Zone, North-East Zone, North-Central Zone, South-West 
Zone, South-South Zone and South-East Zone. Each of the 36 States in Nigeria 
produces three (senators) while the Federal Capital Territory produces one (1) 
senator. Thus, there are one hundred and nine (109) senators in Nigeria. 
However, in the Federal House of Representatives, there are three hundred and 
sixty members (360). This brings the total number of members of the National 
Assembly to four hundred and sixty-nine (469). Besides, there are seven hundred 
and seventy-four (774) local governments in Nigeria.  
The six States that were randomly selected for this study are Adamawa, Edo, 
Enugu, Kaduna, Kogi and Ondo, plus the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. 
Table 1- Geopolitical Zones and the Randomly Selected State from Each Zone 
GEOPOLITICAL 
ZONES 
STATES ACCORDING TO 
POLITICAL ZONES 
RANDOMLY SELECTED STATES 
North-Central Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, 
Plateau 
Kogi 
North-East Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe, 
Taraba, Yobe 
Adamawa 
North-West Jigawa, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, 
Kaduna, Sokoto 
Kaduna 
South-East Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, 
Imo 
Enugu 
South-South Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, 
Delta, Edo, Rivers 
Edo 
South-West Ekiti, Lagos, Osun, Ondo, Oyo Ondo 
Source: Researcher’s compilation 
Table 2 - Gender Distribution of Respondents 
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Gender Frequency  Percent (%) 
 Male 472 72 
 Female 186 28 
 Total 658 100 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
Table 3 - Age Distribution of Respondents 
Age Frequency Percent (%) 
Below 30 
30-39 
40-49 
50-59 
60 and Above 
 
Total 
No Response 
TOTAL 
87 
195 
208 
112 
53 
 
655 
3 
658 
13 
30 
32 
17 
8 
 
100 
 
 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
Table 4 - Distribution of Respondents by Religion 
 
Frequency Percent (%) 
 Christianity 392 61 
 Islam 233 36 
 Others 18 3 
 Total 643 100 
  
 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
Table 4: shows that 61% of the respondents were Christians, 36% were 
Muslims, making the two religions constituting 96% of the all respondents. Again, 
the point is that the two religions which teach against any form of cheating or 
malpractices produce members as politicians. More importantly, the information 
from responses of research participants and literature suggest that religion plays 
little or no role in restraining Nigerian politicians from engaging in undemocratic 
political behaviour. If anything, religion serves as a tool of demagoguery to 
deceive gullible voters. 
Table 5 - Distribution of Respondents by Marital Status 
 
Frequency Percent (%) 
 Single 148 23 
 Married 436 68 
 Separated/ Divorced/ Widowed 
57 9 
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 Total 641 100 
  
 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
Table 5 shows that 68% of the respondents were married, 23% were single, 
and 9% were either separated, divorced or widowed. Thus, the marital statuses 
of the respondents were majorly married and single. From the marriage statuses 
of the respondents, it can be deduced that the Nigerian political environment 
attaches significance to marriage, perhaps as a demonstration of responsibility on 
the part of political participants. 
Table 6 - Distribution of Respondents by Educational Background 
 
Frequency Percent (%) 
 Primary/ Secondary 184 30 
 Tertiary 438 70 
 Total 622 100 
  
 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
Table 6 reveals the educational level of the respondents. 70% of the 
respondents possess tertiary educational qualification and 30% have either 
primary or secondary educational qualification. What is instructive here is that 
most of the respondents are highly educated. But how does the level of 
education of the respondents help the sanctity of democratic practice in Nigeria? 
This question will be addressed by relevant data in the relevant sections of this 
study. This is even more interesting because there are no regulations on 
educational level as requirements for participating in primary elections, as the 
case is with general elections. 
Table 7 - Distribution of Respondents by Occupation 
 
Frequency Percent (%) 
 Unemployed/ Retired 107 16 
 Self Employed 354 55 
 Government Services 165 26 
 Private Services 17 3 
 Total 643 100 
  
 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
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Table 7 shows that 55% of the respondents were self-employed; 16% were 
either unemployed or retired; 26% were in government organizations and 3% 
were engaged by private organizations.  
Table 8 - Distribution of Respondents by Political Party 
 Frequency Percent (%) 
 PDP 320 49 
 APC 338 51 
 Total 658 100 
Source: Fieldwork, 2015 
As shown in Table 8, the party memberships of the respondents are 49% for 
the Peoples Democratic Party and 51% for the All Progressives Congress (APC). 
This represents a fair share of the representation of the two main political parties 
used for this study.  
Table 9, labeled “Coefficients” below, tells the extent to which each of the 
independent variables included in the model contributed to the prediction of the 
dependent variable (election Outcomes/Victory). This can be deduced from the 
column labelled Beta under Standardised Coefficients. Because the goal is to 
compare the contribution of each independent variable, the beta values will be 
used. ‘Standardized’ means that these values for each of the different variables 
have been converted to the same scale so that they can be compared. 
In this case the largest beta coefficient is .174, which is for Votes influenced 
by a combination of Inducement and threats. This means that this variable makes 
the strongest unique contribution to explaining the dependent variable, when 
the variance explained by all other variables in the model is controlled for. The 
Beta value for voting process influenced by intimidation/ fraud was the next 
strongest (.130). Conversely, Votes influenced by ethnic sentiments and religious 
sentiments had the least Beta values (0.65 and 0.67 respectively), indicating that 
they made least of contributions. 
Table 9 - Coefficients 
Model 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
 
B Std. Error Beta B Std. Error 
1 (Constant) .732 .166 
 
4.395 .000 
 
Votes influenced by 
money 
.085 .053 .074 1.602 .110 
 
Votes influenced by 
.097 .053 .082 1.841 .066 
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leaders/ mentors 
 
Votes influenced by a 
combination of 
Inducement and threats 
.178 .050 .174 3.582 .000 
 
Voting process 
influenced by 
intimidation/ fraud 
.133 .048 .130 2.775 .006 
 
Votes influenced by 
religious sentiments 
.068 .045 .067 1.526 .128 
 
Votes influenced by 
ethnic sentiments 
.077 .055 .065 1.415 .158 
 
Use of security agencies 
to intimidate delegates 
.107 .044 .098 2.452 .014 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
The most significant finding of this study is that elections in Nigeria do not 
reflect the norms of democracy but reflect the realities of manipulations of the 
electoral process and outcome to favour those who subscribe to anti-democratic 
tendencies such as intimidation, vote buying, violence and the use of security to 
undermine the will of the people. 
 The implication of this result shows that election outcomes, particularly for 
primary elections, are the result of a combination of acts of demagoguery. 
However, the degree of influence is highest in cases where inducements or bribes 
were complemented by violence or threats to voters or where violence/threats 
to voters were complemented by inducements. 
Also, the study highlights the fact that religion and ethnicity are not as crucial 
in determining who wins or loses election in Nigeria. As important as religion and 
ethnicity are in analyzing every aspect Nigeria, they do not, in the final analysis, 
determine the votes of candidates.  
The result and findings of this study further explains why the “power of 
incumbency” is strongest in determining who wins elections in Nigeria. Thus, 
because the candidate(s) in power has (have) access to more resources and the 
paraphernalia of office, they tend to have more of the means to engaging in 
intimidation of opponents and voters, use of the security agencies to undermine 
democratic norms, buy votes, coerce and undermine voters and election officers 
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to do their biddings, and enforce their will against the will of the majority 
(people). 
Finally, the study shows what accounts for the non-participation of Nigerians 
of good character who may be willing to engage in governance through electoral 
contest but shy away from doing so. The high financial cost of participating in 
democracy in Nigeria coupled with the crude demagoguery manifesting through 
intimidation, violence, assassinations, bribery, and all sorts of manipulations 
associated with the Nigerian Democracy have made democracy a risky venture 
only suitable for Machiavellian politicians who are willing to sacrifice decency and 
virtue in the search for political power. This is so much the case because political 
power is the easiest and surest means of becoming wealthy and influential in 
Nigeria (ANIMASAWUN, 2013; BABANAWA, 2013; OFEMUN, 2010; SULEIMAN, 
2010; SIMBINE, 2004). 
CONCLUSION 
The goal of this study was to examine whether the practice of democracy in 
Nigeria reflected internationally acceptable democratic norms. To achieve this 
goal, the researchers surveyed delegates for the 2015 governorship and 
presidential primary elections in Nigeria. The result results showed clear 
contradictions between democratic principle (ideal norm) and democratic 
practice (real or manifest norm)! 
This study has shown that in Nigeria’s democracy, the political elites and 
electorates pay lip service to the principles and values of democracy and consider 
the antidemocratic practices such as bribery, violence, intimidation of voters and 
election fraud as part of democratic politics. Consequently, leaders that emerge 
from Nigeria’s democratic politics are not always the choice of the people, which 
explains why they are not accountable to the people. 
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Criminalidade e resultados de eleições na 
Nigeria 
                                RESUMO 
Este estudo explora a prática democrática na Quarta República da Nigéria, tendo em 
conta globalmente prescritas e aceitáveis normas, princípios e valores da democracia 
como forma de governo. O estudo foi realizado na Nigéria e adotou uma técnica de 
amostragem de múltiplos estágios para administrar questionário a 700 pessoas nas seis 
(6) zonas geopolíticas de 36 Estados da Nigéria. Os resultados e conclusões mostram que 
a democracia da Nigéria é atormentada com fraudes em massa, incluindo intimidação, 
privação de concorrentes e eleitores de participar no processo democrático, a corrupção 
do processo eleitoral, scam, e declaração fraudulenta de vencedores de eleições. As 
implicações de tal engano democrático na democracia da Nigéria, inclui apatia do eleitor 
resultante da falta de confiança no processo democrático e resultado, violência e 
instabilidade política e da não participação de cidadãos qualificados e honesta na política 
da Nigéria. Consequentemente, os líderes que emergem da política democrática da 
Nigéria não são sempre a escolha do povo, o que explica por que eles não são 
responsáveis perante as pessoas, bem como porque há déficit de confiança do público no 
sistema democrático da Nigéria. 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Eleições. Fraude nas eleições. Democracia. Criminalidade. Nigéria. 
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